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REFORMING THE LAW OF
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
CHRIS MONTVILLE
INTRODUCTION
As the nation continues its shift toward an information economy,
knowledge becomes an ever more significant asset for American
employers. Accordingly, the legal rules that control the flow of this
knowledge between competing firms grow increasingly crucial. These
rules are understandably important for employers seeking to protect
themselves from the misappropriation of their knowledge, and
excessively lax protections could threaten investment in everything
from new industrial processes to innovative marketing techniques.
These rules, however, also have a significant impact on the lives
of employees seeking to use the knowledge and skills they developed
while at one firm to advance their careers at another. If legal
protections excessively restrict the mobility of an employee who has
dedicated years of service to an employer that offers few
advancement opportunities, the rules have failed in two ways. They
fail employees by impeding their opportunities for career satisfaction
and prosperity, and they also fail prospective new employers and the
economy at large because mobility-restricted employees cannot use
their accumulated knowledge and skills in the service of the firm that
will leverage them most efficiently.
Because striking a balance between these interests is so crucial,
commentators have expended significant effort in defining the legal
scope and economic implications of trade secret law, the traditional
tool for maintaining the secrecy of corporate knowledge.1 Many types
of information do not qualify for trade secret protection, however, so

Copyright © 2007 by Chris Montville.
1. In contrast, patent law, the other major statutory protection for valuable information,
requires firms to publicly disclose knowledge as one of its prerequisites for obtaining legal
protection.
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firms increasingly turn to a different and far more vaguely defined
category of protection to limit where employees can go when they
2
leave, and what knowledge they may use once they get there. This
category, alternately referred to as proprietary information or
confidential information, is increasingly invoked in litigation, yet
academics and courts have made few attempts to define its scope.3
This Note begins the process of filling this definitional void. Part
I reviews the two types of legal protections that restrict employee
knowledge: the widely accepted concept of trade secrets, and the
emerging category of proprietary information. This Part then
contrasts trade secrets, a statutorily defined category of information,
with the broader, contractually based realm of proprietary
information.
In Part II this Note introduces the types of information that fall
under the proprietary information rubric. It then surveys the case law
in a number of states and outlines the different approaches courts
take when determining whether knowledge falls under the ambit of
proprietary information. This survey identifies two general
approaches to proprietary information under noncompete
agreements: courts that categorically protect proprietary information,
and those that require the information be specifically identified and
then require the employer to show that it is actually proprietary. This
Part then groups the nondisclosure agreement cases into three
categories: those that treat nondisclosures as noncompetes, requiring
a strict showing of reasonableness; those that apply a general rule of
reason but not the same exacting requirements; and those that
enforce any nondisclosure agreement, even if unreasonable. In
addition, Part II identifies several states that, under some
circumstances, refuse to recognize a concept of propriety information
at all.
In Part III, this Note turns to the theoretical justifications for
proprietary information protections. Considering the two primary
theoretical justifications for recognizing a distinct category of
proprietary information—contractual theories and economic

2. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of Human
Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 739 (2002) (tracking the continuing
increase in both trade secret litigation as well as enforcement of noncompetes).
3. See Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work: New Metaphors for the New Economy, 80
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 839, 855 (2005) (observing that the scope of proprietary information is
“seldom defined”).
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theories—this Part shows that even if these theories were useful in
explaining the need for trade secret law, they fail to justify the broad
additional protections many state courts grant to proprietary
information. To the contrary, a growing body of scholarship suggests
that blanket enforcement of contracts restricting proprietary
information invokes grave fairness concerns while threatening
economic growth.
Accordingly, Part IV concludes that although proprietary
information might require legal recognition in certain circumstances,
courts should take two steps to limit overenforcement. First,
enforceable employment agreements should indicate exactly what
information qualifies as proprietary, and specify precisely how the
employee will be prohibited from using that information. Second, the
traditional and well-established restrictions already placed on
noncompetition agreements should be applied to all restrictive
covenants
in
employment
contracts—whether
traditional
noncompetes or nondisclosure agreements drafted to protect
proprietary information that is not also a trade secret. These rules
would represent a first step toward ameliorating the fairness concerns
and economic costs of blanket protections for proprietary
information. Furthermore, as courts evaluate these more specific
employment contracts, they will be able to develop more cogent rules
about the types of information that are protectable because cases will
turn on explicit facts rather than assumptions about employers’
intentions and needs.
I. THE ORIGIN AND BACKGROUND OF
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
Firms control valuable information in several different ways. To
understand where proprietary information fits in the larger picture,
first envision a continuum of information. On one end lies entirely
unprotected information—widely held knowledge such as common
trade skills or public facts. For this type of information, the law offers
little protection. On the other end of this spectrum lie trade secrets,
highly valuable information that is closely protected within a firm.
These are discussed in Section A.4

4. These trade secrets are creatures of statute, and protected by the states in a relatively
uniform and stringent manner. See infra Part I.A.
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Proprietary information falls somewhere between these two
extremes. Defined and enforced in employment contracts rather than
by substantive law, proprietary information encompasses both trade
secrets as well as knowledge not eligible for trade secret protection.
Section B discusses the contractual mechanisms that give rise to this
proprietary information and sketches the basic differences between
proprietary information and trade secrets.
A. Trade Secrets: The Inner Bound of Proprietary Information
Every state protects trade secrets either by statute or under the
common law, and forty-two5 have enacted statutory protection by
adopting some variation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.6 The UTSA defines a trade secret broadly as
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process that
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
7
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

Although the subject matter beneath the trade secret umbrella
appears quite expansive, the UTSA imposes two specific limits on
trade secrets. First, the protected information must have independent
economic value resulting from its not being known to (or
ascertainable by) others.8 Second, and even more crucially, the firm
asserting protection must undertake a reasonable effort to maintain
9
secrecy.

5. Michael P. Simpson, Note, Future of Innovation, Trade Secrets, Property Rights, and
Protectionism—An Age-Old Tale, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1123 n.8 (2005).
6. For a history of trade secret protection in the United States, see Robert G. Bone, A
New Look at Trade Secret Law: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 251–
60 (1998).
7. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
8. Id. § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. 538.
9. Id. § 1(4)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 538.

04__MONTVILLE.DOC

2007]

3/9/2007 7:48 AM

PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

1163

Every court lends its own gloss to the precise meaning of these
10
requirements, but the secrecy requirement is uniformly critical—
without secrecy, trade secrets lose their value and, in turn, their legal
11
protection. Significantly, trade secret protection cannot be applied to
information that is discernable by proper means or constitutes an
individual’s personal or professional skills,12 and courts routinely cite
13
a number of objective factors to gauge secrecy. The secrecy
requirement thus places the onus on firms to proactively identify and
protect valuable information. This in turn curtails anticompetitive
litigation, brought against departing employees based on a purely ex
post determination that information should have been kept secret.
For information that meets the trade secret definition, the UTSA
provides substantial penalties against misappropriation of that
knowledge. First, the statute bars the transfer of trade secret
information by any “improper means,” including breach of a duty to
14
maintain secrecy or the inducement of a breach of that duty. The
statute authorizes the owner of the trade secret to recover monetary
15
damages from any party who misappropriates its trade secrets.

10. See MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[3] (1999) (“[B]y and large, decisions under
the various UTSAs will be determined by state courts in accordance with their interpretation of
the form of the UTSA adopted by that particular state . . . .”).
11. See id. § 1.03 (“Indispensable to an effective allegation of a trade secret is proof that
the matter is, more or less, secret.”).
12. See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (2006) (“Outside the fuzzy line delineating
protectable trade secrets are . . . categories of unprotectable information [including] . . . that
which constitutes an individual’s personal or professional skills.”).
13. See STEPHAN D. SHANE & WILLIAM J. ROSENTHAL, EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK
§ 15.03[8] (2005) (noting that courts commonly apply these factors both under the common law
and in UTSA jurisdictions). These factors derive from the Restatement of Torts and include the
following:
1. The extent to which the information is known outside the claimant’s business
2. The extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the business
3. The extent of measures taken by the claimant to guard the secrecy of the
information
4. The value of the information to the business and its competitors
5. The amount of effort or money expended by the business in developing the
information
6. The ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
14. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1)–(2), 14 U.L.A. 537.
15. Id. § 3(a), 14 U.L.A. 633–34.
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In addition, if misappropriation or even just the threat of
misappropriation occurs, the UTSA provides injunctive relief against
16
the implicated party. This type of relief is particularly significant in
the employment context, in which workers often transfer jobs after
being exposed to trade secrets in their former roles. In these
situations, an injunction will restrict what knowledge employees may
carry to their future employment. In many states, when coupled with
a noncompete, trade secret knowledge will prevent employees from
working for any competing firm at all.17 And in a few states, this may
occur even without a noncompete: under the controversial doctrine of
18
inevitable disclosure, departing employees with trade secret
knowledge may be barred from joining a competing firm based simply
on the conclusion that they could not realistically perform certain job
functions without disclosing trade secrets.19
Perhaps because courts determine trade secrets using objective
factors rather than by deferring to firms’ own definitions, employers
hoping to restrict the actions of departing employees often turn to
contractual protections of confidential, proprietary information.

16. Id. § 2(a), 14 U.L.A. 619.
17. For example, trade secrets (and proprietary information) have been the interest
underlying the enforcement of restrictive covenants in several high-profile cases in the
technology industry. See, e.g., Tricia Duryee, T-Mobile ex-COO Barred from Job, SEATTLE
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005, at E1 (preliminary injunction issued against a former executive who had
“been exposed to . . . sensitive, proprietary, confidential and trade secret information” and took
employment in the same industry but another state); Verne Kopytoff, Google Settles Hiring Suit;
Ex-Microsoft Exec to Work in China, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 23, 2005, at C1 (describing the
settlement of a suit against a former Microsoft executive who took a position at Google in China
after the trial court issued a preliminary injunction).
18. Although the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Pepsi Co. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir.
1995), may be the most prominent instance of a court adopting this doctrine, a number of states
follow it to some degree. See Eleanor R. Godfrey, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets:
Employee Mobility v. Employer’s Rights, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 161, 167 (2004) (“Some states
clearly subscribe to the doctrine, others apply a restricted version of the doctrine, and others
reject the doctrine entirely.”).
19. The interaction between employment contracts and trade secrets is somewhat circular.
Whereas the existence of a trade secret may support the enforceability of a noncompete, the
creation of a nondisclosure agreement (often coupled with a noncompete) is among the efforts
to maintain secrecy that courts consider when deciding if information rises to the level of a trade
secret in the first place. See EMPLOYMENT LAW YEARBOOK § 18:2.1[B][1] (Timothy J. Long
ed., 2005) (“One step that employers should take to protect the trade secret status of their
confidential information is to require that employees and third parties who are given access to
the information sign confidentiality agreements.”).
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B. The Definition and Mechanics of Proprietary Information
The concept of proprietary information derives, as an initial
matter, from that term’s frequent usage in employment contracts, in
the form of nondisclosure and noncompete agreements. Courts
struggle to precisely define “proprietary information,” but the
American Law Institute (ALI) has attempted to develop a succinct
definition as part of the Draft Third Restatement of Employment Law
(Draft Restatement). This Section first considers what proprietary
information might be, contrasting the Draft Restatement definition
with the UTSA definition of trade secrets, and then turns to
examining how firms protect this information through employment
contracts.
1. Defining Proprietary Information. Although not the law nor
even yet adopted by the ALI, the Draft Restatement provides a useful
starting point for a deeper survey of the case law. Section 6.01
provides that
[a]n employer’s proprietary information is commercially valuable
information that the employer has developed or obtained and taken
reasonable measures to keep confidential. It does not include
information that is generally known, derived from general training
offered by the employer, or is readily ascertainable by proper
20
means.

The contrast between the ALI’s approach to proprietary information
and the UTSA’s definition of trade secrets reveals key distinctions
between the two categories. The first factor involves the value of the
information. Trade secrets gain value by virtue of their secrecy—by
21
being “not being generally known to” competitors. True trade
secrets lose their value if discovered by others. Proprietary
information, meanwhile, needs only some degree of commercial
22
value, and that value need not be diminished by discovery. The
second factor, somewhat recursively defined for both categories,
requires reasonable efforts by the firm to either keep the information
secret (for trade secrets) or confidential (for proprietary
information). The third factor, involving the subject matter of the

20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 6.01 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
21. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. 538.
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 6.01.
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protected knowledge, is the most distinguishing. Trade secrets are
positively and narrowly defined as a “formula, pattern, compilation,
23
program, device, method, technique, or process.” Proprietary
information, on the other hand, may be anything that is not generally
24
known or ascertainable by proper means. This suggests a much
broader and open-ended scope to proprietary information.
Like the Draft Restatement, some courts explicitly recognize
proprietary information as a separate class of knowledge lying
between trade secrets and entirely unprotected information.25 One
state, Florida, even explicitly protects proprietary information by
statute, independent of its status as a trade secret.26 Most courts,
however, recognize proprietary and confidential information more
implicitly, by upholding restrictions against its dissemination without
acknowledging it as specifically protectable and relying on the
definitions provided in the specific employment agreements.
2. The Contractual Underpinnings of Proprietary Information.
Although the Draft Restatement does not explicitly state as much,
most jurisdictions protect proprietary information only with contract
law. The section 6.01 comments assert that an employer may meet the
reasonable measures to maintain confidentially requirement by
“impress[ing] on employees the need for confidentiality,” and by
“ask[ing] employees contractually to agree not to disclose
confidential information.”27 In most jurisdictions, however, such a
contract is not simply a factor in establishing information as
proprietary, but it is the legal foundation for actions to enforce its
protection.28

23. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §1(4), 14 U.L.A. 538.
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 6.01.
25. See, e.g., Richards Mfg. Co. v. Thomas & Betts Corp., Civ. No. 01-4677, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22479, at *15 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2005) (adopting the view that New Jersey recognizes
three categories of valuable information); Shapiro v. Regent Printing Co., 549 N.E.2d 793, 796
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (disagreeing with the defendant’s suggestion “that only trade secrets—as
distinct from confidential information—are entitled to legal protection”); Revere Transducers,
Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 765 & n.2 (Iowa 1999) (holding that a plaintiff need not
prove that confidential information rises to the level of a trade secret to gain protection).
26. In Florida, “[v]aluable confidential business or professional information that otherwise
does not qualify as trade secrets” is explicitly protectable. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(1)(b)2
(West 2002).
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 6.01 cmt. b.
28. See Robert Unikel, Bridging the Trade Secret Gap: Protecting “Confidential
Information” Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 855–67 (1998)
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These contracts include restrictive covenants in two forms:
nondisclosures (or confidentiality agreements) and noncompetes (or
noncompetition agreements). Nondisclosures, the more direct of the
two devices, simply forbid employees from revealing proprietary
information outside the firm, either during or following their
employment. Generally, nondisclosure agreements appear to be
29
widely enforced.
Noncompete agreements, meanwhile, protect proprietary
information indirectly. To understand how proprietary information
supports these agreements, it is helpful to first consider these
agreements generally. Noncompete agreements restrict employees
from working at competing firms, usually within a certain geographic
area and only for a certain length of time. Courts view these
30
agreements as restraints on trade, and, although each state has its
31
own criteria for enforcing them, most apply some variation of the
“rule of reason” found in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.32
Under the rule, noncompetes may be unreasonable, and thus
unenforceable, for one of two reasons. First, the restraint may contain
restrictions “greater than needed to protect the [employer’s]
33
legitimate interest.” In proprietary information cases, a company’s
desire to control its proprietary information comprises this legitimate
business interest. As the Restatement notes, however, it is often
unclear what qualifies as a legitimate business interest.34
Second, a restraint is also unreasonable if the employer’s need
“is outweighed by the hardship to the [employee] and the likely injury
35
to the public.” The extent of the restraint is key to the

(“Express contracts, whether in the form of covenants not to compete or nondisclosure/confidentiality agreements, are perhaps the most frequently employed devices for the
protection of proprietary information.” (footnotes omitted)).
29. M. Scott McDonald, Compete Contracts: Understanding the Cost of Unpredictability, 10
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 137, 149 (2003).
30. T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM.
BUS. L.J. 1, 3 n.11 (2005) (“These types of covenants have traditionally been regarded by the
common law as ‘restraints of trade.’”).
31. Alice J. Baker, Legislative Prohibitions on the Enforcement of Post-Employment
Covenants Not to Compete in the Broadcasting Industry, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 647,
651 (2001) (noting that most states adhere to the limits on noncompetion agreements set forth in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. a (1981).
33. Id. § 188(1)(a) (emphasis added).
34. Id. § 188 cmt. b.
35. Id. § 188(1)(b).
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reasonableness determination: the wider the geographic area
implicated, the longer the restriction’s duration, or the broader the
realm of competitive activity curtailed, the more likely a court will be
36
to find the agreement unreasonable. Additionally, when the
legitimate business interest is information, the nature of that
information should form a crucial component of the reasonableness
37
analysis.
In practice, nondisclosure clauses are frequently tied to
38
noncompetion agreements and the choice of analytical framework
may be less than obvious. Furthermore, unless the facts of a specific
case delineate the subject matter of the proprietary information claim
with unusual rigor, a vague nondisclosure agreement coupled with an
injunctive remedy will have the same effect as a noncompete
agreement—a broad restriction of employee mobility.
The underlying cause of action in proprietary information cases
will depend both on the former employee’s role and the target of the
litigation. When a firm targets a former employee, it generally sues on
a theory of express breach of contract.39 If the former employee is an
officer of the firm, a breach of fiduciary duty theory also applies.40
When the firm targets the new employer, rather than the individual
employee, it may use a theory of tortious interference with contract
instead.41

36. Id. § 188 cmt. d.
37. Comment g suggests that courts engage in a complex, case-by-case evaluation of
whether the public interest is served by the restriction:
Whether the risk that the employee may do injury to the employer is sufficient to
justify a promise to refrain from competition after the termination of the employment
will depend on the facts of the particular case. . . . A line must be drawn between the
general skills and knowledge of the trade and information that is peculiar to the
employer’s business. If the employer seeks to justify the restraint on the ground of the
employee’s knowledge of a process or method, the confidentiality of that process or
method and its technological life may be critical. The public interest in workable
employer-employee relationships with an efficient use of employees must be balanced
against the interest in individual economic freedom. The court will take account of
any diminution in competition likely to result from slowing down the dissemination of
ideas and of any impairment of the function of the market in shifting manpower to
areas of greatest productivity.
Id. § 188 cmt. g.
38. See, e.g., Lamorte Burns & Co. v. Walters, 770 A.2d 1158, 1161–62 (N.J. 2000)
(analyzing an employment agreement involving a nondisclosure agreement as the justification
for a twelve-month restrictive covenant).
39. Unikel, supra note 28, at 855–57. For a comprehensive summary of the legal theories
used to protect “confidential information,” see id. at 854–67.
40. Id. at 859–62.
41. Id. at 862–65.
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These frameworks for protecting proprietary information are
fairly well established and help explain the how of proprietary
information. The ALI’s definition and a comparison with trade
secrets begin to define the scope of proprietary information, but they
tell little about what types of information courts actually protect and
when that information qualifies as proprietary. A survey of the case
law sheds some light on this question.
II. ENFORCING CONTRACTS RESTRICTING PROPRIETARY
INFORMATION: A SUMMARY OF THE CASE LAW
An attempt to survey and categorize the case law surrounding
proprietary information must consider two primary questions. First,
what types of information do courts protect, and second, when do
they protect it. In response to the first question, the cases indicate
that courts will construe proprietary information to protect nearly
42
anything that is not widely held common knowledge. Some types of
information receive more protection than others, however, and
Section A reviews the types of proprietary information most
frequently at issue in employment litigation.
The second question—when do courts protect proprietary
information—is more difficult to answer. Even within a single state,
courts may take contradictory approaches to similar facts.
Accordingly, the proffered categories represent some generalizations
about how courts in different states handle these cases, but as this
Part shows, important differences do exist between the approaches
taken by different states.
Section B looks at judicial approaches to proprietary information
under noncompete agreements, concluding that courts fall into two
broad groups: courts that apply a categorical approach, enforcing
contracts because certain types of information appear formally
implicated by the contract, and courts that apply a factual approach,
requiring that employers identify precisely what information is
42. To further complicate matters, even in individual decisions courts often fail to identify
precisely what subject matter falls under “proprietary information.” In one egregious (but not
atypical) example, a court covered everything from “knowledge” and “materials” to “knowhow,” “marketing,” and “business plans” all within a single injunction. Speech Works Int’l, Inc.
v. Cote, No. 02-4411, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 390, at *14–15 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2002);
see also QSP, Inc. v. Hair, 566 S.E.2d 851, 854 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (protecting “accounts,
business practices, and know-how”); Totten v. Employee Benefits Mgmt., Inc., 61 Va. Cir. 77, 78
(Cir. Ct. 2003) (protecting “customer lists, rate structures, manuals, reports, proprietary
programs and charges for services”).
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proprietary and show that the employee actually possesses the
information.
Section C then considers the nondisclosure agreement cases.
Here, courts fall into three categories: (1) those that apply the same
the rules to nondisclosures as noncompete agreements, (2) those that
apply the general noncompete-agreement “rule of reason” but not its
more exacting requirements, and (3) those that place no
reasonableness restraints on noncompetes.
Finally, Section D considers two circumstances under which
proprietary information becomes enveloped by trade secrets: first,
when courts (such as California) conclude that the law and public
policy counsel against enforcing protections for non-trade-secret
information, and second, when the UTSA preempts a claim for
tortious interference with contract.
A. The Subject Matter of Proprietary Information
The types of subject matter implicated in proprietary information
cases are expansive, but some types appear with greater frequency
than others. Perhaps most frequently at issue are customer lists and
information about customers.43 Although many courts will protect
customer information outright,44 because competitors can frequently

43. See Stone, supra note 2, at 748 (“[C]ustomer information is the most commonly
litigated trade secret issue.”). Some courts explicitly identify customer or client information as a
legitimate business interest to be protected by restrictive covenants. See, e.g., Unger v. FFW
Corp., 771 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (protecting customer lists because the bank
demonstrated a legitimate protectable interest in business goodwill and “the confidentiality of
client lists are part of that [goodwill]”). Other states adopt the view that restrictions on such
information are generally restraints of trade and against public policy. See, e.g., Unisource
Worldwide, Inc. v. Carrara, 244 F. Supp. 2d 977, 986 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (“Illinois case law provides
that a distributor has no proprietary interest in information belonging to the customer . . . .”);
Citadel Broad. Co. v. Gratz, 52 Pa. D. & C.4th 534, 551 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2001) (“The names of . . .
customers . . . are likewise not considered confidential or proprietary information under
Pennsylvania law.”).
44. See, e.g., Owens v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 1988)
(protecting “confidential business information, including customer lists” of insurance policy
holders); Del. Express Shuttle, Inc. v. Older, C.A. No. 19596, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, at *76
(Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2002) (protecting “customer list or related information”); Modis, Inc. v.
Revolution Group, Ltd., No. 99-1104, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 542, at *21 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Dec. 29, 1999) (protecting a technology staffing firm’s confidential knowledge of “which
employers needed technical support help”). But see Clarion Assocs., Inc. v. D.J. Colby Co., No.
1998-23085, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 274, at *15–16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 26, 1999) (concluding
that “the defendant should not be enjoined from direct solicitation of individual potential
customers if the names of such individuals are obtained from sources wholly independent of [his
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ascertain an employer’s customer lists from public sources and
perhaps because of a reluctance to support direct restraints of trade,
some courts single out some special information about the
45
46
customers, such as contract expiration dates or the customers’
47
specific requirements as the basis for protection. Illinois, meanwhile,
follows another route, protecting only “near-permanent” customer
48
relationships.
The oft-invoked rubric of “business knowledge” also covers a
large area of proprietary information. Under this heading, courts
frequently enjoin departing employees having knowledge of cost
49
information and pricing formulas. Proof of actual use of the
50
information by the departed employee is sometimes required, but in
the case of pricing data, simply consistently underpricing the
employee’s former firm has been a sufficient foundation for an
injunction.51 Marketing strategies are also protected,52 even when
former employer’s] book of business or expirations”), appeal dismissed, 714 N.Y.S.2d 99 (App.
Div. 2000).
45. Perhaps for similar reasons, some courts sidestep the entire problem of publiclyascertainable “proprietary information” by identifying the business goodwill associated with
ongoing customer relationships or even the relationships themselves rather than the
confidentiality of the information as the basis for upholding restrictive covenants. See, e.g.,
Millard Maint. Serv. Co. v. Bernero, 566 N.E.2d 379, 386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (“In Illinois, an
employer has a protectable interest in its customers . . . where, by the nature of the business,
[the] employer has a near-permanent relationship with its customers . . . .” (internal citations
omitted)); Unger, 771 N.E.2d at 1244 (maintaining the confidentiality of customer lists bolstered
bank’s goodwill by establishing its reputation for trustworthiness).
46. Stratco Wireless, LLC v. Sw. Bell Wireless, LLC, 95 S.W.3d 13, 17 (Ark. Ct. App.
2003).
47. See, e.g., Donald McElroy, Inc. v. Delaney, 389 N.E.2d 1300, 1306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)
(stating that employers may protect themselves against disadvantageous use of information
acquired through “representative contact”).
48. See Shapiro v. Regent Printing Co., 549 N.E.2d 793, 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (“[A]n
employer’s interest in his customers is adequate for enforcing a covenant not to compete . . .
where, by the nature of the business, plaintiff has a near-permanent relationship with its
customers and but for his or her employment, defendant would not have had contact with
them . . . .”).
49. See, e.g., Millard, 566 N.E.2d at 385 (rejecting the notion that a “pricing formula must
be a trade secret in order to merit legal protection”); Donald McElroy, Inc., 389 N.E.2d at 1304–
05, 1306 (stating that “[an] employer has the right to protect himself from the disadvantageous
use” of a pricing formula, which testimony indicated was based on “well known principles”).
50. See Citadel Broad. Co. v. Gratz, 52 Pa. D. & C.4th 543, 551 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2001)
(declining to enjoin the solicitation of a former employer’s customers when the employer “has
not established that [employee] is utilizing any such data in attempting to attract advertising
accounts”).
51. See Unisource Worldwide, Inc. v. Valenti, 196 F. Supp. 2d 269, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(“While the precise way in which Matrix obtained the information remains murky, it is clear to
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aspects such as advertising methods and the choice of which goods to
53
sell are publicly ascertainable.
Although trade secret law remains the preferred tool for
54
protecting technical information, courts will also protect quasitechnical subject matter under the proprietary information umbrella,
without engaging in the analysis of whether the information qualifies
as a trade secret.55 Finally, business methods are also widely
protectable as proprietary information.56
As this brief survey suggests, courts place few subject matter
limits on the information that may qualify as proprietary. They do,
however, apply the tests associated with the contractual mechanisms
used to protect the proprietary information, generally either a
noncompete or nondisclosure agreement.

the court that every customer serviced by Matrix is a former customer of Unisource and that all
of Matrix’s pricing is the same as or better than Unisource’s.”).
52. See Open Magnetic Imaging, Inc. v. Nieves-Garcia, 826 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2002) (finding that a database of area physicians comprised a protectable business interest
as a “strategic marketing plan”); Platinum Mgmt., Inc. v. Dahms, 666 A.2d 1028, 1038, 1041
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995) (enforcing a covenant intended, in part, to protect “customers’
buying habits, PMI’s [price] mark-up structure, merchandising plans, sales projections and
product strategies”).
53. Cf. United Rug Auctioneers, Inc. v. Arsalen, No. CA03-0347, 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS
189, at *15–16 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2003) (finding that a competing rug distributor engaged
in tortious interference and misappropriation of confidential information for hiring the
competitor’s departing employees and selling the same variety of rugs in the same areas).
54. See Bone, supra note 6, at 248 (“While most cases involve technological subject
matter . . . almost anything can qualify as a trade secret . . . .”).
55. See, e.g., Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., No. 02-1169, 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS
248, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 9, 2003) (protecting, inter alia, recipes for coffee and baked
goods), aff’d, 815 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 2004); Simplified TeleSys, Inc. v. Live Oak Telecom,
L.L.C., 68 S.W.3d 688, 693 (Tex. App. 2000) (finding that computer software development
techniques were protectable by confidentiality agreement despite the fact that “the technical
details of that ‘method’ are not found in the record save in the broadest or most general
terms”).
56. For example, in Markovits v. Venture Info Capital, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 647 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), a district court applying New York law enjoined a departed employee of a patent
consulting company from creating a competing firm because he signed a nondisclosure
agreement, despite a lack of evidence that the employee actually incorporated any of Markovits’
proprietary methodologies—“combin[ing] works from the public domain”—into his new
business, id. at 655–56. The court instead focused extensively on the similarity between the two
companies’ business models and the fact that they were direct competitors. Id. at 656. As in so
many proprietary information cases, the knowledge itself played a secondary role as legal
justification for the enforcement of a restrictive covenant; the court assumed that because the
employee built on his experience by entering the same market as his former employer, he had
necessarily stolen proprietary information. Id.
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B. Proprietary Information under Noncompete Agreements
A noncompete agreement’s enforceability turns on whether or
57
not it protects a legitimate business interest. As noted in Part I, the
definition of a legitimate business interest is often quite vague, and
leaves courts with significant flexibility to fashion general rules. When
employers proffer proprietary information as their protectable
business interest, courts may either adopt a categorical approach,
looking to the language of the contract and the general type of
information protected to determine enforceability, or engage in a
more searching factual inquiry, requiring specificity and a showing
that nonenforcement would present an actual harm to the employer.
1. Categorical Enforcement: Broad Protection for Proprietary
Information. Courts in many states take a casual approach to
enforcing
noncompete
agreements
protecting
proprietary
information, focusing generally on an employer’s invocation of a
broad category of supposedly proprietary information and the degree
of potential harm that might result from competition by the former
employee. These courts focus most strongly on whether the former
employee might cause economic damage to his former employer,
even when that damage may arise simply from ordinary competition.
The alleged importance of the proprietary information to the
employer’s business thus comprises the key attribute of the cases
applying the categorical protection approach. The exact nature of the
alleged proprietary information, meanwhile, plays a secondary role in
these cases. In these jurisdictions, employers may simply identify
general categories without introducing a specific example of the
contested information to the court.58 Consequently, physical

57. See EMPLOYMENT LAW YEARBOOK, supra note 19, § 18.3.2[A] (“As a threshold
matter, courts require an employer to have a ‘legitimate interest’ before they will enforce a
covenant not to compete.”).
58. See, e.g., Boch Toyota, Inc. v. Klimoski, No. 04-966, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 258, at
*9–11 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 24, 2004) (protecting “confidential or proprietary business
information” without specifying exactly what that information might be); EMC Corp. v. Allen,
No. 97-5972-B, 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 102, at *3–9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 1997)
(enjoining a former EMC officer from working at Sun Microsystems because of his exposure to
“confidential and proprietary” information such as product development strategies and
marketing plans, apparently without requiring EMC to demonstrate any efforts to keep this
information secret). This is not to suggest that all Massachusetts cases are so vague. See
Boulanger, 2003 Mass. Super LEXIS 248, at *7 (stating that “so long as the restrictions do not
surpass the bounds of reasonableness, there is no reason to take a narrow view of what is
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misappropriation is unnecessary; “the employee may still be enjoined
if the appropriated confidential information is merely in his or her
59
memory.”
Often, this broad category involves information about customer
requirements and customer information.60 Courts applying this
permissive approach show great deference to these relationships, and
less concern for promoting competition or protecting employee
mobility. One court went so far as to call customer information the
“essence” of a plaintiff’s temporary-staffing business—despite the fact
that the employer’s customers were well known and that the
customers would presumably share this information openly with any
61
staffing firm they hired. Courts may be particularly inclined to
enforce these noncompetes when they include nonsolicitation clauses,
because in many jurisdictions customer goodwill embodies a
legitimate business interest separate from proprietary information
and may support a noncompete agreement on its own. Inexact
judicial language, however, often blurs the lines between goodwill
and proprietary information, making it difficult to surmise if these
cases are truly proprietary information cases or goodwill cases.62
Other vague categories of information qualify for protection
under the categorical approach as well, and not all cases even require
that the information result from any sort of investment. For example,
knowledge of the “strengths and weaknesses of plaintiff’s products”
supported a noncompete agreement when “the loss of even a single
contract could deprive [the former employer] of revenue for many
63
years.”
While placing a detailed focus on the potential harm to the
employer (for example, in terms of lost customers), courts give
minimal consideration to the precise nature of the proprietary
confidential,” but noting that the former employer had identified specific items of proprietary
information and had taken steps to keep them confidential).
59. See Boch, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 258, at *9 (“Whether an employee actually takes
any customer or supplier lists with him is not dispositive . . . .”).
60. See supra Part II.A.
61. Modis, Inc. v. Revolution Group, Ltd., No. 99-1104, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 542, at
*21 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 1999).
62. See, e.g., Cohoon v. Fin. Plans & Strategies, Inc., 760 N.E.2d 190, 195 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001) (stating that “an employer is entitled to contract to protect the good will of the business,”
but stating that “secret or confidential information” is an element of this goodwill). For an
example of how this confusion leads to inconsistent legal rules, see infra note 99 and
accompanying text.
63. Sys. & Software, Inc. v. Barnes, 886 A.2d 762, 765 (Vt. 2005).
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information (as opposed to the ordinary competition) that supposedly
64
led to this harm. Accordingly, because the exact information
remains unidentified, a court cannot even begin to query whether it
actually rises to the level of propriety. Even when some specific
proprietary information has been identified, however, courts in this
group fail to engage in these inquiries.
For example, they often do not require employers to prove the
information has been kept confidential. This occurs most frequently
in Massachusetts cases,65 although courts in other jurisdictions are
equally willing to gloss over the requirement that proprietary
information actually be proprietary.66 Some courts will take a middle
ground, requiring a minimal showing that the employer made some
effort to indicate the documents’ confidentiality, but this effort may
be as trivial as stamping a single document with the word
“confidential,” and may support a preliminary injunction even in the

64. See, e.g., Owens v. Penn Life Mut. Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 1988)
(enforcing a noncompete agreement under Arkansas law because the employer lost sixty
accounts to its former employee, but only generally stating, without support, that the defendant
was given “special training” and “was privy to confidential business information”); Unisource
Worldwide, Inc. v. Valenti, 196 F. Supp. 2d 269, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying New York law
to enforce a covenant to prevent the release of confidential information based on broadlydefined categories of information and because “it is clear to the court that every customer
serviced by the [defendant’s new employer] is a former customer of [the plaintiff] and that all of
[the defendant’s employer’s] pricing is the same as or better than [the plaintiff’s]”); QSP, Inc. v.
Hair, 566 S.E.2d 851, 853–854 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (enjoining a chocolate salesperson from
competing based on evidence that he had solicited the plaintiff’s clients, rather than on evidence
that the proprietary “information concerning . . . accounts, business practices, and know-how”
was either actually confidential, or actually used by the defendant).
65. See, e.g., Boch Toyota, Inc. v. Klimoski, No. 04-966, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 258, *10–
12 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 24, 2004) (protecting employer information without any reference to a
prior safeguarding of its confidentiality); Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., No. 02-1169, 2003
Mass. Super. LEXIS 248, at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 9, 2003) (“[T]he fact that a company has
not done all that it possibly could have done to guard the secrecy of the information is not
necessarily fatal to its defense of the restrictive clauses.”), aff’d, 815 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 2004).
66. See, e.g., Open Magnetic Imaging, Inc. v. Nieves-Garcia, 826 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a marketing database supported a noncompete agreement, but not
citing to any evidence that the database was confidential); Lamorte Burns & Co. v. Walters, 770
A.2d 1158, 1160–61 (N.J. 2001) (rejecting a trial court’s conclusion that the determination of
whether information was confidential or proprietary required a factual inquiry, and instead
granting summary judgment). Although many states approach proprietary information in
inconsistent ways, New Jersey may be among the worst offenders. See infra note 75 and
accompanying text (discussing a New Jersey federal court’s conclusion that New Jersey law
requires a searching four-factor inquiry into the proprietary information of employer
information).
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face of highly conflicting evidence suggesting that the employer failed
67
to protect the entire asserted category of information.
Nor do courts employing the categorical approach generally
require plaintiffs to show that outsiders cannot easily recreate the
68
asserted proprietary information. Sometimes courts will even reach
this conclusion explicitly, first finding that the publicly ascertainable
aspects of the proprietary information remove them from the ambit
of trade secret protection, but then proceeding to enforce a
69
noncompete agreement protecting the very same public information.
These courts also apply a wide presumption that if employees
could theoretically use the proprietary information in their new
70
employments, they necessarily will. Consequently, they rarely
conduct any fact-specific inquiry into the question whether
irreparable harm has been demonstrated. As an Indiana court
reasoned, “[w]hen a covenant not to compete of this nature is
breached, it follows that the employer will suffer harm,”71 despite the
lack of any showing that such harm would actually occur or that the
employee had actually taken any confidential information.
The categorical approach permits firms to create vague
noncompetes, broadly protecting “proprietary information” or
subsets thereof, and then enjoin employees based on whatever
knowledge they happen to obtain—no matter how nonsecretive or

67. McGlothen v. Heritage Envtl. Servs., L.L.C., 705 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999).
68. See, e.g., Unisource Worldwide, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 277–78 (rejecting defendant’s
contention that information “readily ascertainable outside the employer’s business” cannot be
protected by a restricted covenant).
69. See Del. Express Shuttle, Inc. v. Older, C.A. No. 19596, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, at
*73, *76–78 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2002) (finding publicly ascertainable customers lists are not a
trade secret, but nonetheless enforcing a noncompete agreement based on the proprietary
nature of those same customer lists).
70. See, e.g., Marcam Corp. v. Orchard, 885 F. Supp. 294, 297 (D. Mass. 1995) (“[T]he harm
to [the employer] cannot be avoided simply by the former employee’s intention not to disclose
information . . . . [H]e does not go with a tabula rasa with respect to [the former employer’s
proprietary information] . . . .”); Statco Wireless, LLC v. Sw. Bell Wireless, LLC, 95 S.W.3d 13,
19 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he fact that [it would be possible for an agent to sell for a
competitor without disclosing confidential information] does not necessarily prevent
enforcement of the covenant. The question is whether [the defendant] would be able to use the
information obtained to gain an unfair competitive advantage.”); Neff Motivation, Inc. v.
Largrou, 2002-Ohio-2788U, at ¶ 66 (Ct. App. June 7, 2002) (enforcing noncompete because
defendant salesperson’s “knowledge and experience” with customers “would give him a distinct
advantage over [plaintiff’s] replacement salesman, one that otherwise cannot be avoided”).
71. McGlothen, 705 N.E.2d at 1074.
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nonspecific—during the performance of their job duties. In these
jurisdictions, employee mobility comes second to the unsubstantiated
interests of a former employer, often indistinguishable from ordinary
competition.
2. The Specificity Approach: Requiring Employers to Show
What They’re Protecting—And Why. Not every court employs such a
casual approach, however. Courts in a number of states often require
employers to meet several criteria before enforcing noncompete
agreements based on proprietary information. Most frequently, they
require employers to (1) draft contracts narrowly and specifically,
identifying the precise proprietary information supporting the
agreement; (2) prove that this allegedly proprietary information is
confidential and at least somewhat unique to the plaintiff firm; (3)
demonstrate that the former employee possesses the proprietary
information and will actually use it to compete; and (4) show that the
former employer will actually suffer irreparable harm as a result.
Each of these fact-specific inquiries necessarily turns on the
presence of the first: without a clear idea of what proprietary
information the employer lays claim to, employees are hard-pressed
to know what they are relinquishing. Courts, likewise, are hardpressed to evaluate whether this claim adequately supports a
noncompete agreement.72 Consequently, some courts require that
noncompete agreements identify the specific information protected
73
and that protection of this information be reasonably narrow. For

72. See WebMD Health Corp. v. Martin, No. 601654-06, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS. at 24–30
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 11, 2006) (applying Delaware law to reject the plaintiffs’ contention that
“Delaware law requires them only to demonstrate the ‘nature’ of the confidential information,
and not to ‘actually share the secret information’” with the court, and consequently refusing to
issue a preliminary injunction enforcing a noncompete agreement).
73. See, e.g., Serv. Ctrs. of Chi., Inc. v. Minogue, 535 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
(finding a confidentiality agreement “defining confidential information as essentially all the
information provided by [the plaintiff] to [the defendant] ‘concerning or in any way relating’ to
the services offered by [the defendant]” to be unreasonably broad); TGR Enters., Inc. v.
Kozhev, 167 Ohio App. 3d 29, 2006-Ohio-2915, 853 N.E.2d 739, at ¶ 31 (“The fact that the
covenants . . . were written so broadly does not establish that [the defendants] were necessarily
using or revealing . . . protected information. However, the breadth of the covenants does call
into question whether the covenants are reasonable and enforceable . . . .”); see also Richards
Mfg. Co. v. Thomas & Betts Corp., Civ. No. 01-4677, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22479, at *19
(D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2005) (describing New Jersey’s four-factor test for proprietary information,
including whether the information is “specific and ‘highly specialized’” (quoting Ingersoll-Rand
v. Ciavatta, 110 N.J. 609, 638 (1988))).
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some types of information, physical misappropriation may even be
74
required.
In cases where the employer does identify proprietary
information specifically, courts will then often require some evidence
that the proprietary information is actually proprietary to the firm as
well as, to some degree, confidential. In New Jersey, for example,
“[f]ailure to maintain the purportedly confidential information in a
secretive manner [weighs] against a finding of a protectable
75
interest.” So too would a finding that the information is not unique;
“if purportedly confidential information, or substantially similar
information, exists within a competitor’s facility, it would likely not be
76
protected.”
In some states, the employer must also demonstrate that the
former employee possesses and has actually used the proprietary
information. In these cases, simply showing that the defendant
competed with a former employer fails to support an injunction
enforcing a noncompete agreement; actual proof of damage resulting

74. See Citadel Broad. Co. v. Gratz, 52 Pa. D. & C.4th 534, 551 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2001) (“The
names of . . . customers which [the defendant] has retained via her memory are likewise not
considered confidential or proprietary information under Pennsylvania law.”).
75. Richards Mfg., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22479, at *19; see Shapiro v. Regent Printing Co.,
549 N.E.2d 793, 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (finding “it difficult to ascertain from the record what,
exactly was confidential about [the former employer’s] pricing formula” and concluding that the
information thus “falls short of being a protectable business interest entitled to injunctive
relief”); DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 684 (Tex. 1990) (“[W]hile confidential
information may be protected by an agreement not to compete, Wackenhut has failed to show
that it needed such protection . . . . Wackenhut failed to show that its customers could not
readily be identified by someone outside its employ . . . or that its customers’ needs could not be
ascertained simply by inquiry addressed to those customers themselves.”).
Of course this more-exacting confidentiality analysis may still lead to enforcement of a
noncompete agreement when the plaintiff-employer meets the criteria. See, e.g., Statco Wireless,
95 S.W.3d at 19 (enforcing a noncompete agreement when the former employer “was very
careful about who it provided customer lists to; and it had a policy to retrieve confidential
information from terminated agents”).
76. Richards Mfg., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22479, at *18. New Jersey courts also consider
whether the information is “current.” Id. at *21; see also A Place for Mom, Inc. v. Leonhardt,
No. C06-457P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58990, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 4, 2006) (holding a
noncompete agreement enforceable “only insofar as [the employer] can prove that [its former
employee] has unfairly availed himself of information that is uniquely proprietary and available
only to . . . employees” (emphasis added)); Citadel Broad. Co., 52 Pa. D & C.4th at 551 (denying
a preliminary injunction to enforce a noncompete agreement because the supposed proprietary
information was “generally known or available throughout the radio broadcasting business”);
DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 684 (“Also, Wackenhut failed to show that its pricing policies and
bidding strategies were uniquely developed, or that information about its prices and bids could
not, again, be obtained from the customers themselves.”).
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77
from the proprietary information is required. In Texas, courts also
impose an adequate-consideration requirement that the exchange of
proprietary information be either contemporaneous with the signing
of a noncompete agreement, or that the employer be contractually
bound to provide this information in the future.78 This inquiry
necessarily requires the plaintiff to specifically identify the exact
proprietary information protected.
Although the factual inquiries undertaken by the courts
following this general approach vary, they each begin by requiring
employers to specifically identify the alleged proprietary information.
As Part IV argues, this basic step alleviates many of the economic and
fairness concerns associated with proprietary information as a
noncompete-agreement-supporting “legitimate business interest.”
Fundamentally, this approach recognizes that employers may invoke
proprietary information as a way to restrict competition by impeding
the mobility of their employees in the face of public policy limits on
general noncompetes. If the information is not actually proprietary,
or competitors may obtain it legally and easily, these courts
reasonably conclude that impeding competition—not the flow of
proprietary information—is the true purpose of these contracts.

C. Proprietary Information under Nondisclosure Agreements
When courts consider the reasonableness of proprietary
information under nondisclosure agreements, in some respects the
inquiry varies in the same ways as under noncompete agreements.
Some courts will allow employers to define proprietary information
quite broadly, enforcing virtually anything that might be a “logical

77. See A Place for Mom, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58990, at *9 (granting only a limited
injunction because “[p]laintiff has yet to produce any evidence that [d]efendant is using
information which is only available through their proprietary database to compete with them”).
78. This is because, in Texas, at-will employment is not sufficient consideration to bind a
noncompete agreement; rather, there must be a contemporaneous exchange of confidential or
proprietary information to support the agreement, or a promise to provide such information.
Morse Wholesale Paper Co. v. Talley, No. 14-05-01180-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7196, at *6–
7 (Tex. App. Apr. 18, 2006); see also Trilogy Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc., 143
S.W.3d 452, 460–61 (Tex. App. 2004) (finding a noncompete agreement unilateral and
unenforceable because the plaintiff “could have avoided its ‘promise’ . . . to provide information
and training to [the employee] by terminating [the employee’s] at-will employment
relationship”); Wright v. Sport Supply Group, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 289, 297 (Tex. App. 2004)
(upholding a noncompete when a noncompete agreement “obligated [the employer] to provide
confidential information and training and the record establishes it did so”).
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79
area[] of concern for the employer.” Most that engage in the
analysis, however, are at least somewhat more exacting.
A less subtle doctrinal rift informs whether courts even reach this
analysis in the first place, however. This rift exists between courts that
80
apply the same “rule of reason,” requiring geographic and temporal
reasonableness, to nondisclosure agreements as well as noncompetes,
and those that either apply a watered-down version of the rule or
hold it to be entirely inapplicable. Each approach represents a
fundamentally different view of how nondisclosure agreements affect
employees and competition.

1. Treating Nondisclosure Agreements as Noncompete
Agreements.
In some jurisdictions, courts treat nondisclosure
agreements that restrict former employees after their employment in
the same manner as they would a noncompete agreement with the
same purpose. Some of these courts do so without referencing the
noncompete agreement rules directly, instead establishing similar
rules that apply specifically to nondisclosure agreements.81 Others
make the analogy more explicit, reasoning that, as restraints of trade,
noncompetition clauses must be construed against the employer and
invalidated if the broadest possible reading renders them
unenforceable.82
In almost all of these jurisdictions, the basic inquiries about
83
proprietary information that apply to noncompete agreements
resurface. Courts impose specificity requirements,84 many inquire into

79. Totten v. Employee Benefits Mgmt., Inc., 61 Va. Cir. 77, 78 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (finding that
these supposed areas of concern include “customer lists, rate structures, manuals, reports,
proprietary programs, and charges for services”).
80. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
81. See Pregler v. C&Z, Inc., 575 S.E.2d 915, 917 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
82. See Phoenix Renovation Corp. v. Rodriguez, 439 F. Supp. 2d 510, 521–22 (E.D. Va.
2006) (referring to nondisclosure agreements generally as “post-employment restraint[s],” and
refusing to enforce such an agreement that was unreasonable).
83. See generally supra Part II.B.
84. See Schwan’s Consumer Brands N. Am., Inc. v. Home Run Inn, Inc., Civil No. 05-2763,
2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 32879, at *16–17 (D. Minn. Dec. 9, 2005) (refusing to enforce a vague
nondisclosure agreement that would leave the court to speculate about the confidential or
proprietary nature of the allegedly proprietary documents); Pregler, 575 S.E.2d at 917 (refusing
to enforce a nondisclosure by injunction because “[it] lacks sufficient detail to fully apprise [the
defendant] of which materials may not be used or disclosed” (quoting Sanford v. RDA
Consultants, Inc., 535 S.E.2d 321, 325 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000))); Serv. Ctrs. of Chi., Inc. v. Minogue,
535 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (“By defining confidential information as essentially
all of the information . . . ‘concerning or in any way relating’ to the services offered by [the
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whether the employer in fact treated confidential information as
85
confidential, and some require that employers demonstrate a
compelling reason for protecting the information.86 Finally, these
courts expect durational and geographic limits on nondisclosures just
87
as they would noncompetes. As a general observation, however,
even though these courts apply the same tests as those applied to
noncompete agreements, they tend to do so in a somewhat less
exacting manner.88
Yet even the jurisdictions placing the most aggressive limits on
nondisclosures confine their reasonableness inquiry to nondisclosures
that protect proprietary information not rising to the level of a trade
89
secret. This limitation implicitly acknowledges that by statutorily
defining and protecting trade secrets, state legislators have prioritized
an employer’s property right in certain types of information over the
unfettered rights of employees to use that information in future
employment. For the broader, contractually-defined realm of
proprietary information, however, jurisdictions applying a
reasonableness inquiry fundamentally recognize that, without some

defendant], the confidentiality agreement amounts in effect to a post-employment covenant not
to compete which is completely unrestricted in duration or geographical scope.”).
85. See Propath Servs. v. Ameripath, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:04-CV-1912-P, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27846, at *13–20 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2004) (fashioning a narrow injunction regarding
only material that the departing doctor had produced during his tenure with the employer,
despite concluding the information had not received confidential protection).
86. See, e.g., Joseph Chris Pers. Servs., Inc. v. Rossi, Civil Action H-03-2341, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29760, at *9–10 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2005) (applying Wisconsin law to a provision
baring employees from disclosing former employer’s current or potential clients “serve[d] only
as a threat to paralyze [the plaintiff’s] workers”); Passalacqua v. Naviant, Inc., 844 So. 2d 792,
796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (refusing to enforce a nondisclosure agreement when the
employer “did not articulate how any activity, method or technique . . . was unique or
proprietary in any way”).
87. See, e.g., Phoenix Renovation Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d at 521–22 (finding a nondisclosure
agreement without a geographic limit unenforceable); Sunstates Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v.
Griffin, 449 S.E.2d 858, 860 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (enforcing a nondisclosure agreement on
business knowledge because it had a two-year duration).
88. See Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 761 (Iowa 1999)
(holding that “[n]ondisclsoure-confidentiality agreements enjoy more favorable treatment in the
law than do noncompete agreements” yet applying the noncompete test to a nondisclosure
agreement); see also Lamorte Burns v. Walters, 770 A.2d 1158, 1161–68 (N.J. 2001) (engaging in
a factual evaluation of a nondisclosure agreement’s propriety, but concluding that the employer
had taken sufficient steps to maintain confidentiality and enforcing the agreement despite some
evidence to the contrary).
89. See Pregler, 575 S.E.2d at 917 (noting that a time limitation is required for a
nondisclosure agreement to be reasonable unless the information is a trade secret).
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limits, nondisclosure agreements become no more than unbounded
and unrestricted restraints on competition.
2. The Middle Ground: Borrowing the Language—But Not the
Law—of Noncompete Agreements. In other jurisdictions, courts
invoke the general rules from noncompete cases without applying the
same specific requirements. These courts, either sub silentio or
explicitly, jettison the more stringent rules that apply to noncompete
agreements—primarily the prohibition on covenants of unrestricted
geographic and durational scope. For example, one Virginia court
declined to enforce a noncompete agreement on the ground that it
had an uncertain geographic and durational scope.90 In the same case,
however, it enforced a nondisclosure agreement from the same
employment contract—also lacking a geographic or time limitation—
on the general bases that it was “no greater than . . . necessary to
protect the employer’s legitimate business interests, nor [was] it harsh
and oppressive in preventing the employee from earning a living and
it [was] not in restraint of trade or violative of public policy.”91
Another court, in an unusually thorough opinion, concluded that
the test used for noncompete agreements should be applied to
nondisclosures, but that “the absence of restrictions concerning time
or geographic location do not render a [nondisclosure] agreement
presumptively unenforceable . . . because the inquiry whether the . . .
agreement unreasonably restricts the employee’s rights would address
the breadth of the restrictions regarding disclosure.”92 This approach
creates an awkward middle ground, utilizing two different standards
that turn on the contractual form rather than the contract’s effects.
For an employee whose marketable skills in an industry are
intertwined with supposedly proprietary information, the legal
distinction may not matter as much as these courts believe.

90. Totten v. Employee Benefits Mgmt., 60 Va. Cir. 342, 344 (Cir. Ct. 2002).
91. Totten v. Employee Benefits Mgmt., 61 Va. Cir. 77, 78 (Cir. Ct. 2003).
92. Revere Transducers, 595 N.W.2d at 762; see also Bernier v. Merrill Air Eng’rs, 2001 ME
17, ¶ 18, 770 A.2d 97, 103–04 (engaging in a reasonableness analysis of a nondisclosure
agreement but concluding it did not create an undue hardship because the former employee was
not prevented from “using the general skill and knowledge he [had] acquired during his
employment”). For a defense of the broad freedom to contract for trade secrets as adopted in
Bernier, see C. Rachal Pugh, Case Note, Bernier v. Merrill Air Engineers, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 231 (2002).
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3. Unrestrained Enforcement of Nondisclosures.
A third
approach goes even further, treating nondisclosures as entirely
unburdened by the restrictions on other postemployment restraints.
For example, the Tenth Circuit refuses to characterize confidentiality
and nondisclosure agreements as noncompetes because they “serve
entirely different purposes than do agreements not to compete and
93
must be analyzed on the basis of those distinct purposes alone.”
Explicitly rejecting the argument that nondisclosure agreements are
no more than disguised noncompetes, this approach theoretically
permits enforcement of nondisclosures even if vague and overly
broad.94
Under this approach, a nondisclosure agreement prohibiting
former employees from using nonsecret proprietary information will
be enforced regardless of its reasonableness. A substantively identical
noncompete agreement supported by a protectable business interest
in proprietary information, meanwhile, will receive judicial scrutiny of
its geographic and durational limits as well as its impact on the
employee’s right to work.
D. Nonrecogition of Proprietary Information
Some courts avoid the entire debate, flatly refusing to recognize
proprietary information in one of two circumstances. First, in
California (and lower courts in several other states), employers may
only contractually protect information rising to the level of a trade
secret. Second, in actions between firms (rather than against
employees), some courts interpret the preemption language of the
UTSA to bar suits for tortious interference with contract in the
context of proprietary information.
1. Refusing to Recognize Proprietary Information on Policy
Grounds. One state, California, stands alone in explicitly refusing to
recognize a distinct category of proprietary information at all.
95
California has a statutory prohibition on restraints of trade, which
courts interpret as foreclosing contractual protection for proprietary
information under both noncompete and nondisclosure agreements.

93. Harvey Barnett, Inc. v. Shidler, 338 F.3d 1125, 1134 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Mai Basic
Four, Inc. v. Basis, Inc., 880 F.2d 286, 288 (10th Cir. 1989)) (applying Colorado law).
94. See id. (reversing a district court’s conclusion that a nondisclosure was unenforceable
because it was vague and overly broad).
95. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997).
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The noncompete cases are unified and unequivocal in holding the
clauses entirely unenforceable. In one case, vacating an injunction
issued to enforce a nonsolicitation agreement protecting proprietary
information, a California Court of Appeal noted that California’s
statutory prohibition against restraints on trade had only a limited
exception for the misappropriation of trade secrets—an action that, as
the court notes, would be illegal under the law of unfair competition
even in the absence of a restrictive employment contract.96 If courts
permitted further contractual expansion, “[e]mployers could insert
broad, facially illegal covenants . . . [and m]any, perhaps most,
employees would honor these clauses without consulting counsel or
challenging the clause in court.”97
Lower courts in a few other jurisdictions, particularly New York,
have suggested in dicta that trade secrets and confidential or
proprietary information are coextensive. One New York court
struggled to reconcile two seemingly inconsistent precedents from the
New York Court of Appeals: In one case, the court plainly stated that
“[w]here the knowledge does not qualify for protection as a trade
secret and there has been no . . . commercial piracy we see no reason
to inhibit the employee’s ability to realize his potential both
professionally and financially by availing himself of opportunity.”98 In
another case the same court held that employers had a legitimate
business interest in the goodwill associated with client relationships,
which may include proprietary information about the clients.99 The
court ultimately concluded that the goodwill rule controlled only if
the plaintiff could show irreparable harm, a standard which was not
met because the customer lists at issue did not constitute a trade
secret.100 In addition, because the noncompete agreement had a
determinate length and thus any resulting harm from its
nonenforcement would also be limited to that time, the harm was not
96. Arrowhead Fin. Group v. Welty, No. E032190, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11100, at
*16–17 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2002); see also Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic
Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 577–78 (Ct. App. 1994) (“Business and Professions Code section
16600 prohibits the enforcement of Metro’s noncompete clause except as is necessary to protect
trade secrets.”); Esquire Deposition Servs. v. Manus, No. B175370, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 10548, at *15–16 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2004).
97. Arrowhead Fin. Group, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11100, at *17 (quoting Kolani v.
Gluska, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 257, 260 (Ct. App. 1998)).
98. Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 594 (N.Y. 1976).
99. BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1224–25 (N.Y. 1999).
100. Kanan, Corbin, Schupak & Aronow, Inc. v. FD Int’l, Ltd., 797 N.Y.S.2d 883, 889–90
(Sup. Ct. 2005).

04__MONTVILLE.DOC

2007]

3/9/2007 7:48 AM

PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

1185

101
Because the other alternative (a noncompete
irreparable.
agreement of unlimited durational scope) would likely have been
unreasonable under New York law,102 this approach effectively denies
injunctive relief for any confidential information that does not rise to
103
the level of a trade secret.
Courts in other jurisdictions have flirted with similar rules as
104
well. Despite these trial and intermediate appellate court holdings,
however, California stands alone in reliably refusing to recognize a
separate category of proprietary information.

2. UTSA Preemption of Proprietary Information. Under certain
circumstances, the UTSA itself may bar enforcement of agreements
protecting proprietary information. This occurs when, rather than
suing former employees directly,105 companies target competitors who

101. Id. at 890 (distinguishing the case presented from Johnson Controls, Inc. v. APT
Critical Systems, 323 F. Supp. 2d 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), in which the indeterminate duration of an
injury was central to finding irreparability of the harm).
102. See, e.g., Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Koch Indus., 497 F. Supp. 462, 471 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (noting that covenants not to compete must be reasonable “both in scope and duration”).
103. See Legal Sea Foods, Inc. v. Calise, No. 03 Civ. 4958 (DLC), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14527, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2003) (holding a noncompete unenforceable under New York
law because plaintiff restaurant’s recipes and food safety plans were not trade secrets), vacated
on joint motion by the parties, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23674 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Zemco Mfg., Inc.
v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 759 N.E.2d 239, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“Because we have
held herein that Zemco had no protectable trade secrets, we also hold that there was no damage
to Zemco from the transfer [of information protected by a non-disclosure agreement].”);
Marietta Corp. v. Fairhurst, 754 N.Y.S.2d 62, 66 (App. Div. 2003) (refusing to grant injunctive
relief for the breach of a confidentiality agreement when the former employer could not
demonstrate an explicit breach of the agreement and the information was not a trade secret),
modified, Marietta Corp. v. Pac. Direct, Inc., 781 N.Y.S.2d 387 (App. Div. 2004); Hair Say, Ltd.
v. Salon Opus, Inc., No. 5106-01, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 543, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 17,
2005) (“Hairsay has failed to establish that the customer list is a trade secret leaving
Defendants, its former employees, free to compete.”).
104. See, e.g., Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 210 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2000)
(reviewing Massachusetts decisions and expressing “some doubt about whether and how the
Massachusetts courts differentiate among confidential information, proprietary information,
and trade secrets,” but declining to reach the question); Unisource Worldwide, Inc. v. Carrara,
244 F. Supp. 2d 977, 989–90 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (“The parties concede that under Illinois law, there
is no apparent functional difference between ‘confidential information’ and ‘trade secrets.’”);
United Rug Auctioneers, Inc. v. Arsalen, No. CA03-0347, 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 189, at *14
(Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2003) (“Trade secrets and confidential information are essentially
identical concepts.”). The Massachusetts cases are especially surprising, given that state’s
extremely generous definition of proprietary information under noncompete agreements. See
supra note 58 and accompanying text.
105. See ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 38 (2003) (“Many firms . . . choose not to sue departing
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have hired a former employee, alleging tortious interference with
contract. Some courts limit these claims to those involving trade
secrets, holding that section 7 of the UTSA, which states that the Act
“displaces conflicting tort . . . law,” preempts suits over mere
106
proprietary information.
In a suit by a firm against a competitor who had hired a former
employee bound by a confidentiality agreement, a court considered
107
108
this language as codified under Tennessee law. The court held that
the UTSA delineated the outer bounds of the plaintiff’s property
rights in its proprietary information, concluding that “[i]f the
information is a trade secret, the plaintiff’s claim is preempted; if not,
the plaintiff has no legal interest upon which to base his or her claim.
Either way, the claim is not cognizable.”109 Although the Tennessee
court is not alone in reaching this result,110 other courts have held that
claims for tortious interference with contractually-defined proprietary
111
In jurisdictions
information survive adoption of the UTSA.
adopting the preemption approach, however, an ironic anomaly
develops: employers remain free to enforce contractual proprietary
information restrictions against departing employees, but not against
the firms who hire them and would actually make use of the
proprietary information. This inconsistency suggests that the
approach may constitute a sound reading of the statute, but it lacks a
mooring in fairness or economic efficiency—concerns that, as the next

employees; firms that do sue departing employees are criticized in the industry and have trouble
recruiting; and firms that sue departing employees . . . rarely accomplish anything by doing
so.”).
106. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (2005).
107. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1708(a) (2001).
108. Hauck Mfg. Co. v. Astec Indus., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 649, 654–57 (E.D. Tenn. 2004).
109. Id. at 657.
110. See, e.g., Compuware Corp. v. IBM, No. 02-CV-70906, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24894, at
*23 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2003) (finding a tortious interference claim preempted by Michigan’s
adoption of the UTSA); Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 132 F. Supp. 2d 643,
648–49 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding that the Illinois Trade Secret Act preempts plaintiff’s tortious
interference claim because the research and development–related “confidential information” in
contention fell within the scope of the subject matter covered by the Act), rev’d on other
grounds, 285 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
111. See, e.g., Stone Castle Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F. Supp. 2d
652, 659 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“[U]nless it can be clearly discerned that the information in question
constitutes a trade secret, the Court cannot dismiss alternative theories of relief as preempted
by the [Virginia codification of the] UTSA.”); Smithfield Ham & Prods. Co. v. Portion Pac, Inc.,
905 F. Supp. 346, 350 (E.D. Va. 1995) (“[Claims for trade secret misappropriation and tortious
interference] may be wholly independent, indeed in this case they are.”).
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Part discusses, should play a significant role in informing how courts
treat proprietary information.
III. THE HUMAN AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF CATEGORICAL
PROTECTION FOR PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
As shown in Part II, courts apply a continuum of approaches to
defining proprietary information, the broadest of which grants
employers the freedom to create and enforce broad definitions of
proprietary information, only sometimes applying lax reasonableness
restrictions normally imposed on covenants not to compete. Although
this approach may comport with vague notions of freedom to
contract, it ignores both the role of substantive fairness in the
employer-employee bargaining process and the economic
consequences of casually enforcing such agreements. Scholarly
literature, considering the problem in the context of trade secrets or
more general noncompete agreements, suggests that these sorts of
agreements have high costs. As this Part argues, the possible
consequences become even more severe when these theories are
applied to proprietary information. In other words, if trade secret
protection and narrowly construed restrictive covenants are
harmful—as commentators suggest—broad protection for proprietary
information is even worse.
A. Categorical Protection for Proprietary Information Raises
Fairness Concerns
Courts adopting the categorical approach to proprietary
information generally proceed under the assumption that most
information can be protected, provided that the resulting restrictions
qualify as vaguely reasonable. The underlying legal principles, to the
extent the courts identify them, most often rest on invocation of
contract theory or consent-based principles.112 As the argument goes,
nondisclosure and noncompete agreements signify an employer’s
willingness to hire a prospective employee only if secure that the
employee will not take its proprietary information and use it in the
service of a competitor. Prospective employees, meanwhile,

112. See Stone, supra note 2, at 739–40 (“When an employment relationship includes a
covenant not to compete or not to disclose specific information, it is reasonable to assume that
the employee has consented to restrictions on his or her post-employment activities.
Accordingly, there is a strong argument for courts to enforce the covenant . . . .”).
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voluntarily accept these restrictions as conditions of their new
employment. In an efficiently functioning market, the employees
would theoretically receive higher compensation to offset their
decreased mobility and marketability. Under these principles, courts
are inclined to enforce employment contracts, barring some
particularly striking public policy concern.113
These contract-oriented arguments encounter several difficulties.
Most simplistically, as courts and commentators often note,
bargaining power is rarely equal at the commencement of
employment and, especially with the use of restrictive covenants so
widespread in certain industries, employees frequently have little
choice but to accept these terms of employment.114
In the realm of proprietary information, one must also question
whether these contracts truly reflect informed consent. Employees
sign most confidentiality and noncompete agreements at the
115
commencement of employment. At that juncture, employers know
the content of the proprietary information they hope the agreement
will cover. Yet if the firm discloses the actual information to
employees before they sign an agreement, the information will lose its
valuable status because the prospective employee would have the
information but not yet be bound by contract. An information
asymmetry results: the firm has far more information about what
knowledge will be restricted than the employee does.116
This information asymmetry suggests not only unfairness during
the bargaining process but also that employees who sign such
contracts do not receive higher compensation in return for agreeing
not to depart with knowledge they acquire during their tenure.
Employees are compensated in two ways: first with money, and
second with knowledge and skills that will increase their potential for

113. 2 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 197 (2d ed. 1999) (“[T]he cases
invoke public policy to alter pure contract doctrine. . . . [N]onetheless, contract issues underlie
all questions of interpreting restrictive covenants.”).
114. See id. at 195 (noting that “[t]he typical inequality of the parties in bargaining power is
one important distinction” between restrictive covenants involving employees and those used in
the sale of a business).
115. In fact, employment agreements signed after the commencement of at-will employment
are sometimes held unenforceable for lack of consideration. See supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
116. See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383,
393–94 (1993) (recognizing information asymmetry in employee-employer negotiations).
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117
better future employment. An employee may thus rationally
sacrifice knowledge for proportionally higher compensation.118
When firms write contracts defining proprietary information
vaguely, employees have no way of knowing the degree of future
marketability that they have contracted away, and this ability to
alienate their human capital is lost. Firms, meanwhile, have a strong
incentive to downplay the significance of the proprietary information
restriction to prospective employees, because the less the perceived
degree of the restriction, the less compensation prospective
119
employees will accept.
Trade secret law helps address this problem by providing default
120
rules. The UTSA and the case law developed under it have
delineated the scope and meaning of a trade secret, and both
employee and employer therefore have at least some concept of what
may be included before employment commences.121 But no such
default rules exist for proprietary information, and an inefficient
labor market results.
The categorical approach exacerbates these problems. As the
case law demonstrates, many courts will enforce nondisclosure and
noncompete agreements protecting completely unspecified
proprietary information. Some will not even require that the exact
122
nature of the proprietary information be identified at trial. Such
enforcement encourages broad overreaching by employers. Firms can
safely require new employees to sign away their rights to a world of
knowledge they do not yet grasp, knowing that if the employee ever

117. See Jay L. Koh, From Hoops to Hard Drives: An Accession Law Approach to the
Inevitable Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 271, 313 (1998) (discussing how
an employees’ skills can add to their value on the labor market beyond the value of the trade
secrets they possess).
118. Id.
119. See George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the
Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1065, 1071 (2002) (“[Some]
explanations [of contracting parties leaving verifiable factors unexploited] suggest that, when
information is asymmetric between the parties, the better-informed party may refrain from
proposing a more complete contract because, in doing so, she may communicate private
information to the other party and thereby compromise her share of the contracting surplus.”).
120. See Nathan Newman, Trade Secrets and Collective Bargaining: A Solution to Resolving
Tensions in the Economics of Innovation, 6 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 3–4 (2002)
(characterizing trade secret law as a set of default rules alternative to covenants not to
compete).
121. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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leaves to join a competing firm, most courts will find something in the
employee’s head that appears, at least on the surface, confidential and
proprietary even though courts would be mistaken to hold that the
123
employer has an absolute property right over the information.
The categorical approach also violates what Professor Katherine
124
Stone refers to as the “new psychological employment contract.”
Stone observes that in recent years, educated employees and bluecollar workers alike find themselves in high mobility job markets.125
As a result, Stone argues, employees today are motivated not by
guarantees of secure, long-term employment and generous retirement
plans, but rather by promises that their “human capital” will be
enhanced through training and experience, while their “social capital”
is built through networking opportunities with other departments,
vendors, and customers.126 She suggests that when firms use
restrictions on knowledge sharing to forbid departing employees from
taking the human and social capital with them, employers violate this
implicit employment contract.127
One might criticize Stone’s theory on the basis that an explicit
written employment contract—a nondisclosure or noncompete
agreement—should trump this implicit contract because it represents
more accurately the shared understanding between firm and
employee. But when proprietary information is vaguely defined and
123. Some courts hold that firms have a property right in trade secrets. Most prominently, in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), the Supreme Court addressed this issue in a
takings claim by a pesticide manufacturer. The manufacturer claimed that the disclosure of
secret health, safety, and environmental data to the Environmental Protection Agency
constituted a taking. Id. at 998–99. The Court held that because state trade secret law had
created a protectable property interest in the data, it qualified as property for the purposes of
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1012. The Court emphasized that “the extent of the property
right . . . is defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret protects his interest from
disclosure to others.” Id. at 1001.
When applied to proprietary information, this reasoning holds little sway, however. In
Monsanto, the court held that a property right existed because of expectations that were created
by state law. In proprietary information cases, meanwhile, it is the employer defining the scope
of the property right, purely through contract and only against a single employee. To say that
state enforcement of the employment contract creates a property right would begin a circular
and conceptually unlimited definition of protectable knowledge as property, especially when
most employment agreements are so vague that anything can be protected.
124. See Stone, supra note 2, at 731 (“The academic literature about the new psychological
contract tries to characterize the new set of expectations that managers impart to their
employees . . . .”).
125. Id. at 727–28.
126. Id. at 735–36.
127. Id. at 763.
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employees commence employment with no substantive knowledge of
the scope and subject matter encompassed by the phrase “proprietary
information,” the restrictive covenant abrogates the new
psychological employment contract without the employee’s knowing
consent.
This argument applies with particular strength to the realm of
proprietary information. Consider, for example, a sales representative
in a typical customer information case who signed a restrictive
covenant at the commencement of a long term of employment. After
years of employment, most of the increase in her human capital will
be in the form of familiarity with the requirements and whims of the
potential customers who live within her geographic region. Enforcing
a restrictive covenant that stipulates such (nonsecret) information as
confidential and proprietary leaves her with neither the implicit
contract of secure long-term employment from the earlier era or
today’s implicit promise of training and career development.
B. Broad Controls on Proprietary Information Increase Transaction
Costs and Threaten Economic Growth
Although few commentators have directly addressed the
economic consequences of protecting proprietary information, a
number of arguments are consistently advanced to justify general
protections of trade secrets and restraints of human capital through
noncompetes. On their surface, these arguments also seem to form an
appealing rationale for enforcing broader protections of proprietary
information. These arguments are subject to extensive criticism,
however, especially when applied to the unique characteristics of
proprietary information as enforced by most courts.
In evaluating the economic justifications for enforcing
restrictions on proprietary information, one must inquire not about
whether trade-secret-like information in general should be protected,
but rather whether explicit justifications exist for contractually
protecting information that falls outside the statutory scope of trade
secrets. The pivotal question becomes, what information should
acquire a legally protected status simply because an employer has
designated it confidential or proprietary in agreements with
employees who, in most cases, have not yet been exposed to the
information they have promised not to disclose?128

128.

See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
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1. Categorical Protection for Proprietary Information is
Economically Unnecessary and Has Anticompetitive Effects. The first
common argument for protection proposes that strict protections are
necessary to encourage the creation of valuable information despite
129
130
the public goods problem associated with informational goods.
Because many types of knowledge require investment to collect or
produce, innovators need assurances that they can recoup their
investment by profiting in the market. If the information flows out of
the firm through former employees, competitors will be able to
underprice information producers and eliminate their ability to
recoup an initial investment, thus destroying any incentive to engage
in such investment in the future. This classic rationale forms the basis
for the limited monopolies granted by both the copyright and patent
regimes, and is frequently mentioned in support of trade secret law as
well.131
A number of scholars have criticized this reasoning as applied to
trade secrets, notably Professors Edmund Kitch and Alan Hyde.
Kitch argues that several self-protecting characteristics of valuable
information make additional contractual protection unnecessary.
First, he maintains that “valuable information” is difficult to steal
because it only exists in unorganized and difficult-to-appropriate
forms.132 Second, information that is not subject to patent or copyright
protection generally has a high depreciation rate.133 Third, he argues
that markets are organized specifically to transmit information such
as pricing, so firms mutually benefit from the flow of this data and it
will quickly be disclosed even when legally restricted.134
These arguments demonstrate why proprietary information
requires only minimal legal protection, because the subject matter of

129. The public goods problem arises from two unique aspects of information: it is
nonrivalrous (an unlimited number of firms can utilize the information simultaneously) and
nonexcludable (it is difficult to prevent others from using the information in the absence of legal
or physical protections). See HYDE, supra note 105, at 46 (explaining the public goods problem);
Bone, supra note 6, at 262–63 (same).
130. Unikel, supra note 28, at 846–47; see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics
of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 708–09 (1980) (sketching out the
conventional welfare analysis applied to contractual protections of valuable information).
131. See Bone, supra note 6, at 262 (“The incentive-based argument is one of the most
frequently invoked in the trade secret literature today.”).
132. Kitch, supra note 130, at 711–12.
133. Id. at 713.
134. See id. at 716–20 (detailing the principle of information communication through the
price mechanism).
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proprietary information, even more than trade secrets, tends to
depreciate at a particularly high rate. Business methods and
marketing models, by their very nature, inevitably become public as
firms interact with suppliers and customers. Customer lists face a
similar temporal limitation, because in most industries customers do
not have a permanent relationship with a single vendor, and
competing firms may identify and market to those customers in other
ways. Finally, pricing data, another common form of proprietary
information, becomes public as the market functions normally.
Accordingly, liberal protections of proprietary information
provide few direct benefits for firms. Significantly, Kitch’s
observations are even more valid today than in 1980 because as the
rates of product and business development continue to increase,
information becomes valueless ever more quickly,135 and nonsecret
information such as the supposedly proprietary information
commonly at stake in litigation loses its valuable status particularly
quickly as it becomes widely known.
So if much of proprietary information requires no legal
protection, why do firms litigate to enforce vague nondisclosures and
noncompetes? The answer likely lies in the anticompetitive nature of
these agreements. In many of the categorical approach cases, a
common theme repeats: the information at stake is neither
particularly secret, nor particularly valuable to competitors. Firms’
actual rationales for suing to enforce the employment agreements are
often to prevent a direct competitor from entering their markets. The
proprietary information supposedly at the crux of the litigation simply
provides a rationale for accomplishing that goal.
A special line of criticism applies to the protection of pricing
information and cost formulas. This information will often fail to
qualify for trade secret protection because it must necessarily be
revealed to current and potential customers, yet courts will often
consider it a legitimate business interest.136 Allowing employers to
protect this sort of information has particularly significant costs. Free

135. See Jack E. Karns & Roger P. McIntyre, Are Intellectual Property Rights Protected in
Employment Contract Covenants Not to Compete Given the Rapid Rate of New Product
Development?, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 631, 644–46 (2001) (discussing the Second Circuit’s
skepticism that a one-year noncompete agreement protecting proprietary information was
necessary in the Internet information technology industry, and advising technology firms to
make sparing use of narrowly drafted employment agreements).
136. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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dissemination of pricing information forms the basis of perfect
competition and creates an essential foundation of an efficiently
137
Whereas an employer who occupies a
functioning market.
semimonopolistic position in a particular market may indeed be
harmed if potential competitors undercut its pricing, firms are free to
compete by reducing pricing rather than restraining former
employees from competing. Costs to consumers are thus reduced, and
firms must innovate rather than simply restrain competition by taking
advantage of informational asymmetries in the market.
2. Broad Protection for Proprietary Information May Impede
Innovation. Whereas Kitch explains why protections for proprietary
information are unnecessary, Professor Hyde’s theories suggest that
eliminating them might actually spur innovation. In his analysis of the
information economics of high velocity labor markets, Hyde argues
that the information spillover associated with high employee mobility
and nonenforcement of restrictive covenants and trade secrets
actually has economic benefits for employers and employees alike.138
Hyde builds on Professor AnnaLee Saxenian’s observations that the
Silicon Valley region, where employee mobility is high and restrictive
covenants and trade secret laws are rarely enforced, consistently
outperforms the high-tech Massachusetts Route 128 corridor of
vertically integrated, low-turnover firms.139
To explain the disparity in economic terms, Hyde argues that the
Silicon Valley experience demonstrates that as the engine of
economic growth, information actually becomes more valuable when
widely shared, and even if companies cannot fully maximize their
returns, they will nevertheless continue to produce valuable
information because even information known by competitors still
140
creates returns greater than the marginal cost of production.
It follows that the less a firm initially invests in valuable
information, the less of a marginal return it needs to justify the
investment despite its dissemination to other firms. Proprietary
137. See ALAN GILPIN, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMIC TERMS 166 (3d ed. 1973) (identifying
“[c]omplete knowledge, [that is,] each buyer knowing what price is being asked for a particular
commodity in every part of the market,” as a key demand-side factor required for markets
approaching perfect competition (emphasis omitted)).
138. HYDE, supra note 105, at 55–60.
139. ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 1–4 (1994).
140. HYDE, supra note 105, at 50–51.
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information, especially the sorts of proprietary information that do
not qualify for trade secret protection, falls among the least valuable
of legally protectable knowledge and is thus the least worthy of legal
protection, for most proprietary information is so relatively valueless
that firms have not endeavored to keep it truly secret. Furthermore,
the most common sorts of proprietary information—customer lists,
141
business models, and pricing information —exist entirely by virtue of
participation in a functioning market and do not necessarily represent
any independent investment at all. If legal enforcement of
proprietary-information-protecting contracts were reduced, firms
would continue to produce this sort of information, and the market as
a whole would benefit from its wider dissemination as firms improved
on each other’s work.
Hyde’s analysis also provides a useful economic counterpoint to
the corporate morality justifications for enforcing wide restrictions on
142
proprietary information. Hyde, considering the “human capital
market,” observes that companies who build their business on the
information they “purchased” by hiring experienced employees but
then attempt to restrict outgoing information with noncompete or
nondisclosure agreements are free riding on the work of their
competitors.143 Accordingly, a narrow definition of proprietary
information would benefit not only departing employees but also
entire industries. Through careful interpretation of employment
agreements, courts can place substantive limits on free riding by
limiting information hoarding to situations in which a firm clearly
identifies its proprietary information and provides concrete
justifications for secrecy rather than using courts to enforce post facto
restraints on trade.
3. A Broad Definition of Proprietary Information Increases
Transaction Costs and Reduces Employee Compliance. Advocates of
heightened protection sometimes suggest that contractual restrictions
on proprietary information reduce certain kinds of transaction costs.
As the argument goes, in the absence of legally enforceable
restrictions, employers will be forced to resort to expensive and

141. See supra Part II.A.
142. See generally Don Wiesner & Anita Cava, Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L.
REV. 1076 (1988) (discussing corporate ethics in the context of trade secret theft).
143. HYDE, supra note 105, at 68.
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inefficient methods of physically controlling valuable information.
Because employers would be forced to carefully limit dissemination
of information to a few select employees, widespread productivity
145
would consequently be diminished.
Other sorts of transaction costs increase, however, when broad
contractual protection of proprietary information is permitted.
Because every contract takes a unique and often very broad form,
litigation over proprietary information is highly unpredictable,
making settlement less likely and increasing litigation costs.
Furthermore, although the case law surrounding statutory trade
146
secrets cannot be fairly characterized as lucid, it certainly appears
more cohesive, or at least more extensively analyzed, than the
common law in suits over proprietary information discussed in Part
II.
In addition, employees subject to these agreements have little
idea of what materials are actually protected. In an empirical study of
Silicon Valley employee attitudes towards trade secrets, Professor
Yuval Feldman found that broad trade secret laws have little
deterrent effect because employees are unaware of what information
is covered and do not believe they will actually be sued.147 With ad
hoc, unevenly enforced contractual provisions on proprietary
information, it follows that there is even greater ambiguity and even
less deterrent effect. In addition, broad and vague contractual
restrictions increase a firm’s motivation to engage in costly frivolous
lawsuits specifically designed to restrain former employees from
competing.148
IV. MINIMIZING THE COSTS OF PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
Considering the economic and fairness concerns raised in Part III
regarding the broad enforcement of proprietary information, this Part

144. See David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP.
61, 67–69 (1991) (arguing that trade secret law reduces transaction costs).
145. Id.
146. See Bone, supra note 6, at 279 (“[T]rade secret law is replete with open-ended
standards and vague balancing criteria . . . .”).
147. Yuval Feldman, Experimental Approach to the Study of Normative Failures: Divulging
of Trade Secrets by Silicon Valley Employees, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 105, 140
(empirically observing that the ambiguity in the legal definition of trade secrets reduces the
likelihood of formal enforcement).
148. Bone, supra note 6, at 279.
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argues that more minimal protections will better serve both firms and
their workers. At the same time, this Part implicitly recognizes that
the freedom to contractually protect valuable information is well
established in the common law and perhaps sometimes economically
149
beneficial. Accordingly, rather than advocate a California-like rule,
this Part proposes a more modest and feasible approach.
First, courts in all states should adopt the fact-intensive
specificity approach, requiring employment contracts to identify
precisely what kinds of information are considered proprietary and
employers to show at trial that employees actually possessed this
information. Courts should refuse to enforce employment contracts
with vague definitions of proprietary information or that contain
restrictions unnecessary to actually protect such information. Second,
courts should apply the same standards used for noncompete
agreements to nondisclosure agreements, especially when employers
ask for injunctive relief that might limit employee mobility. Together,
these requirements will ameliorate some of the fairness concerns and
economic costs of protecting proprietary information without
drastically upsetting the established doctrine.
A. Requiring Specificity and Reasonableness Would Make EmployerEmployee Contracting More Fair
Universal adoption of the strict specificity requirement for
agreements protecting proprietary information, coupled with
stringent application of the rule of reason to nondisclosure
agreements, would help mediate the fairness concerns associated with
these covenants. When employment agreements must identify
precisely what proprietary information forms the foundation of a
noncompete agreement or nondisclosure agreement, employees gain
at least some understanding of what future knowledge they bargain
away and are able to place an economic value on that knowledge. It
also becomes easier for firms to reach pareto efficient results—in
terms of increased compensation to offset the knowledge the
employee relinquishes—when both sides know the subject of their
bargaining is. Such a requirement would also prevent employers from
taking advantage of their position by changing their end of the
bargain and expanding restrictions on the employee during
employment, for example, through such nominal steps as stamping

149.

See supra Part II.D.1.
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150
Finally, limiting
the word “confidential” on a document.
enforcement of employment agreements to those specifying precise
and narrow types of knowledge would give employees some
151
awareness of which aspects of Stone’s new psychological contract
their new employer will not fulfill. This solution is far from ideal—for
example, even when employees know what information qualifies as
proprietary, they may not appreciate its economic value until they
have been employed in the industry for some period of time—but it
does represent an improvement over completely unbounded
contracts.

B. A Specificity Requirement Would Temper the Negative Economic
Effects of Proprietary Information
Requiring specificity and a factual reasonableness inquiry of all
contracts restraining employee use of proprietary information
addresses Kitch and Hyde’s observations about the nature of valuable
152
information. First, a heightened specificity requirement will ferret
out the least valuable proprietary information—the sort that Kitch
suggests will most frequently protect itself. The reasonableness
inquiry, meanwhile, allows courts to decline enforcing agreements
that use proprietary information as a guise for restraining legitimate
competition. In addition, by requiring employers to identify their
intent to restrict such information at the onset of employment, courts
can move toward applying a proper public welfare analysis to
contracts with potentially wide-ranging negative consequences,
leading to the development of brighter-line rules in crucial areas such
as pricing and customer information.153
The proposed approach will also increase informational
154
spillover by protecting less information, resulting in benefits for
firm research and development, particularly by requiring durationally
limited nondisclosure agreements that protect non–trade-secret
information. It will likewise decrease the information hoarding that
occurs when large employers tie their employees to noncompete and

150. See supra note 67.
151. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text.
152. See supra Part III.B.
153. Some states have already done this with regard to customer lists. See supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 138–43 and accompanying text.
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broad nondisclosure agreements by limiting protection to specificallyidentified information.
C. Heightened Specificity Will Increase Compliance and Lower
Transaction Costs
By requiring employers to specify at the commencement of
employment the exact scope of the knowledge being contractually
protected, these sorts of transaction costs may also be tempered.
Litigation would become more predictable as courts moved toward a
cohesive body of case law delineating which categories are
protectable and which categories are not. Compliance would also
increase as employees would be better able to comply with
nondisclosure agreements having a reasonable, well-defined scope.
Moreover, as Feldman suggests, they would be more inclined to
comply with the knowledge that courts would enforce certain types of
employment agreements.155 As a result, litigation resulting from
employee noncompliance would decrease.
CONCLUSION
Despite the increasing significance and incidence of
postemployment restraints on proprietary and confidential
information, few courts have explicitly addressed the existence of this
category of information. Even fewer have taken any steps toward a
consistent doctrine for interpreting such agreements, and some fail to
even identify precisely what information forms the basis of an
injunction.
This broad approach encourages overreaching by employers,
impedes the fair negotiation of employment agreements, increases
transaction costs, harms employee compliance, and threatens
economic growth. With these concerns in mind, courts should require
those employment agreements purporting to protect proprietary
information to narrowly specify exactly what interests are at issue.
Recognizing that nondisclosure agreements often have the same
effect as noncompete agreements, they should also consistently apply
rules of reason. When employers overreach by relying on the vague
rubric of “confidential or proprietary information” to unreasonably

155. See Feldman, supra note 147 (demonstrating that employee compliance corresponds to
perceptions of enforceability).
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impede employee mobility, courts should refuse to enforce these
agreements to the benefit of both employees and the market at large.

